The Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on Anticipation: Its Modern Significance by Rappeport, Jack J.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 11 
Number 1 Miami Law Quarterly Article 8 
10-1-1956 
The Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on Anticipation: Its 
Modern Significance 
Jack J. Rappeport 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Jack J. Rappeport, The Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on Anticipation: Its Modern Significance, 
11 U. Miami L. Rev. 85 (1956) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol11/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
THE EQUITABLE SEPARATE ESTATE
AND RESTRAINTS ON ANTICIPATION:
ITS MODERN SIGNIFICANCE
JACK J. RAPPEPORT*
It is frequently assumed that with the enactment of the Married
\Vomen's Property Acts, the equitable separate estate doctrine has become
obsolete' and is at present of historical significance only. It is the object
of this article to show that the sweeping generality of this statement is
erroneous and to indicate the possibilities of using the separate estate
device, together with the restraint on anticipation, as an alternative to
spendthrift trusts.
A spendthrift trust creates a right in property held by one person for
the benefit of another and contains valid provisions against alicnation of
the property right either by the voluntary acts of the beneficiary or by
acts of his creditors. The basis of the spendthrift trust doctrine is that
a donor ought to retain complete freedom in disposing of his property
in any wayl he sees fit, and enforcement of the intention of the donor
is emphasized above all other considerations2. By the creation of a
spendthrift trust, the trust property passes to the trustee, but the power
of alienation by the beneficiary of his interest in advance, not being regarded
as a necessary attribute of such an interest, a restraint thereon is not felt
to be inconsistcnt with the attributes of complctc ownership, although
after accrued income is paid over to the beneficiary, spendthrift provisions
would cease to operate thereon. The beneficiary takes the whole legal
title to the accrued income at the moment it is paid over to him. On
the other hand, it is arguable that alienability of an equitable estate is
as much an inherent incident thereof as it is of a legal estate. Therefore,
a restraint on alienation being contradictory to the grant is repugnant
thereto and void. rI'hls is the English view 3 which has always disallowed
spendthrift trusts on the notion that to allow a person to enjoy the
benefits of property without subjecting it to the payment of his debts
encourages idleness and promotes fraud. Although the English courts
have never permitted a restraint on the alienation of the interests of other
beneficiaries of a trust, they have uniformly upheld restraints on anticipation
in connection with the separate estate of a married woman, and until
*1.S., LL.B., LL.NI., Asst. Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Stetson University
College of Law, St, Petersburg, Fla.
1. 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPEvlY § 5,55 (1952); laskins, Estate by the Mfarial
Right, 97 U. PA. L. R,v. 345, 351 (1949).
2. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1876).
3. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jim. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811).
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1935 England expressly continued the restraint on anticipation as part of
the Married Women's Property Acts of 1882 and 1893.4
The separate equitable estate of the married woman was a device
invented by the English courts of equity in the 18th Century to enable
women to hold property free from the interference of their husbands.
There bad for some time been a growing dissatisfaction with regard to
the legal attitude toward married women, particularly with reference to
married women's property. While the married woman's capacity to hold
or receive title to real property was not destroyed by marriage, the fee
remaining in her, yet a husband acquired the right to possess and to
enjoy the rents and profits of his wife's real estate owned at the time
of marriage or acquired during coverture. Owners of property who had
married or marriageable daughters and who desired to make inter vivos
settlements or provisions in their wills for their daughters wanted to devise
a scheme to keep the rents and profits of a wife's land and the title to
her personalty out of the control of her husband. There were two instru-
mentalities at hand to aid in developing such a scheme. In the first
place, as a procedural matter, there was nothing to bar interspousal suits
in equity.0 By the late 16th Century, a woman before marriage occasionally
entered into a contract with her intended husband providing that she was
to have a limited power of disposition over her property; in such cases,
4. MARRIED WOMsEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 45 & 46 VICT., c. 75 (1882); MARRIED
WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 56 & 57 VICT., c. 63 (1893).
Section 19 of the Act of 1882 provides that "nothing in this Act . . . shall
interfere with or render inoperative any restriction against anticipation."
Section I of the Act of 1893 contains a proviso "that nothing in this section
contained shall render available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising out of such
contract any separate property which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from
anticipating." Cf, Pelton v. Harrison, [1891.1 2 Q, B. 422.
5. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 IIARv. L. REv.
1030 (1930),
At common law, a woman's capacity to hold or receive title to property
was not destroyed by marriage, but marriage had important consequences.
It gave a man a right to use and enjoy whatever property his wife owned at
the time of marriage or acquired during coverture, A husband acquired the
right to possess his wife's real estate and to enjoy the rents and the profits
thereof, but the fee remained in the wife. His interest was described as 'an
estate for joint lives,' since coverture normally could be terminated only by
the death of one of the parties, but more accurately, it was an estate for
the duration of coverture. If lie predeceased his wife, the fee was in her;
if she predeceased her husband, the fee went to her heirs, subject to a life
estate in the husband by the curtesy if issue had been horn alive. The
husband had a right to use his wife's choses in action, and to this end to
reduce them to possession, after which they became chattels personal. In
view of the perishable nature of chattels and the common law denial of
estates therein, his right to use these involved such complete dominion
as to amount to ownership, and, consequently, marriage was said to give him
the legal title by operation of law.
Cf. Rappeport, The lhusband's Management of Community Real Property (n-n.
published manuscript, Harvard Law Library 1956, page 9, note 34).
6. See McCuRoY, CA ss ON 1)OxrESTIc RELATIONs 527-32 (4th ed. 1952) for a
collection of relevant cases.
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equity might afford relief.7 In the second place, equity had already
developed the trust device.' Moreover, toward the end of the 17th
Century, whenever a husband, his creditor or assignee sought to invoke
the aid of equity to reach the wife's equitable assets, such as property
in the hands of a trustee or an equitable chose in action, equity would
not afford its aid until an adequate settlement had been made out of the
property for the separate use and benefit of the wife and issue of the
marriage. This result followed from an application of the principle that
"he who seeks equity must do equity," and cime to be called the wife's
"equity to her maintenance" or "equity to a settlement." Thereafter, the
imposition of a condition that a suitable portion of the proceeds be set
aside for the separate maintenance of the wife was extended to cases
involving the wife's equitable choses in action, even where the husband
did not have to invoke the aid of equity.10 This extension was necessary
to avoid collusion between the husband and his creditors, particularly where
the creditor was the obligor on the wife's chose.
Opposed to this background, we have the proposition that equity would
follow the law in matters within the compass of the law, and a simple
trust was not regarded as giving any greater rights at equity than at law.
Moreover, the equity to a settlement did not provide the wife with
adequate protection, because, among other things, equity would not impose
this condition in cases where the husband had adequately provided for
the wife. Consequently, in the beginning of the 18th Century, some
bold settlors added a provision in the trust instrument to the effect that
the property should be held free from the control or interference of her
husband and from liability for his debts, and equity permitted this device
to succeed. However, this provision had to be expressly made by the
settlor of the trusts to be effectual in preventing the husband from im-
mediately acquiring an interest in her equitable estate.
The original purpose of the doctrine of separate estate in equity
being the protection of the married woman from her husband's influence,
the device of conveying to the sole and separate use of the wife worked
well at the outset. To create a separate equitable estate in the wife, the
usual practice was to convey property to a third person as trustee. Though
the legal title was in the trustee, the property was regarded as the separate
estate of the wife, and the trustee had the duty of carrying out her wishes
as to its disposition. Property might also be conveyed to the husband as
7. Avenant v. Kitchin, Choyce cases 154, 21 Eng. Rep. 91 (1581-1582); Palmer
v. Keynell, 1 Chan. Rep. 118, 21 Eng. Rep. 524 (1637-1638); 5 HOLDSWORTIH,
HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw 310-11 (4th ed. 1935).
8. 5 HOLDSWORTH, IIISTORY OF ENCLIsn LAW 312-14 (4th ed. 1935).
9, Earl of Salisbury v. Bennet, Skinner 285, 90 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.B. 1691);
Lupton v. Tempest, 2 Vern. 626, 23 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ch. 1708).
10. Lady Elibank v. Montolieu, 5 Ves. Jun. 737, 31 Eng. Rep. 832 (Ch. 1801);
Haskins, Estate by the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 345, 351 (1949); But see
Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fla. 629 (1885).
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trustee for his wife's sole and separate use or even to the wife herself.'
If no trustee were named, the husband's interest at law vested in him as
trustee, free from his creditors, and lie was required to hold that title
for the separate use of the wife.
Both in England and the United States, it was not uncommon for a
testator in creating a trust for his children to provide that the interests
of the daughters should be held for their sole and separate use, free from
the control and interference of their husbands, even though at the time
the will was made or at the death of the testator, some or all of the
daughters might be young children.' 2 Since the equitable separate estate
would be operative only during coverture, the provisions as to a beneficiary's
separate use would attach when the daughter married, as to that portion
of the property of which she had not disposed, but as long as she was
unmarried, she might dispose of her interest as freely as if it were not
limited to her separate use.' 3
Thereafter, equity decided that it was necessary with respect to
equitable separate property to give the married woman an independent
personal status and to invest her with the rights and powers of a person
who is sui juris. This took the course of building up the power of
disposition in respect to the equitable separate estate to the same extent
as though the wife were a feme sole. This power to alienate, however,
could lead to the defeat of the very object of the married woman's
separate estate, because under the husband's influence or coercion, the
wife could be prevailed upon to dispose of her property in favor of her
husband or his creditors.'
11. Bennet v. Davis, 2 P. Wins. 316, 24 Eng. Rep. 746 (Ch. 1725).
The settlement of property 'night be lnade by third persons or the husband
himself even during coverture. Cf. Shepard v. Shcpard, 7 Johns Ch. 57 (N.Y. 1823).
Although at common law a direct conveyance from husband to wife would be wholly
void, a trust was imposed on the husband for the separate maintenance of the wife.
In this case, a direct conveyance by the husband under circumstances indicating that
its purpose was for the wife's Maintenance was upheld even in the absence of a
statement to the effect that the property was to be for her "sole and separate use."
As time went on, the wife's separate maintenance was not expressly mentioned
in the conveyances, but they were held valid on the ground that the conveyance was
presumed to be for that purpose, since the husband had a duty to support the
wife This is analogous to the situation of resulting uses, where one party conveys
to another without consideration and equity presumes a resulting use in favor of
the grantor. But where the grantee is the wife, the grant without consideration
would raise no such prestmption in equity because of the duty of the husband to
snpport his wife. Riley v. Riley, 25 Conn. 154 (1856).
12. Robinson v. Randolph, 21 Fa. 629 (1885); Bridges v. Wilkins, 56 N.C.
342 (1857); Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tem. 156, 185 SAV. 1075 (1916). But see Apple v.
Allen, 56 N.C. 120 (1856).
13. The doctrine applied to both Teal and personal estate. In Pennsylvania,
the rule appears to be that a separate estate can be created only if the woman is
either married at the time of the settlement or if the provision is made with respect
to a particular contemplated marriage. Ouin's Estate, 144 Pa. 444, 22 Ati. 965
(1891); Neale's Appeal, 104 Pa. 214 (1883); Hamerstey v. Smith, 4 Whart. 126
(Pa. 1839). •
14. Hulme v. Tenant, I Bro. C.C. 16, 28 Eng. Rep. 958 (Ch. 1778); Pybus v.
Smith, 3 Bro. C.C. 341, 29 Eng. Rep. 570 (Ch. 1791); Jones v. Harris, 9 Ves. Jun.
486, 32 Eng. Rep. 691 (Ch. 1804).
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In consequence of the failure of repeated attempts by settlors to
restrict the full proprietary rights conferred by implication upon a married
woman under a gift to her "sole and separate use," Lord Thurlow, acting
in a private capacity as a trustee for a marriage settlement, introduced
a clause against any anticipation of the income by the wife.15 Thereafter,
this clause became the accepted formula and was recognized in subsequent
decisions as imposing a valid restraint upon the married woman's power
of alienation, not only as to a life estate, but also as to a fee.Y' Analytically,
this may be spoken of as an anomaly upon an anomaly, because the
doctrine of jus disponendi as to separate estates in equity is itself an
anomaly; a restraint on anticipation where restraints on alienation are not
permitted is a further anomaly, but it was a necessary one to carry out
the purpose of the settlement.' 7 However, in the United States, there
is considerable authority to the effect that the power of disposition is
derived from the settlor and not from the general powers of an owner.
Under this reasoning, a restraint on anticipation is not quite so anomalous
as the English doctrine, because the married woman's power of disposition
is regarded as only a limited power provided for in the settlement and
no more.' The effect of the restraint clause in any event was that a
married woman could not dispose of nor encumber the corpus of the
property under restraint during her coverture, nor could she transfer any
rights over future income. Her engagements were binding only upon so
much of her income as had fallen due and was payable at the date she
15. Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025, (Ch. 1817), wherein
it held that the trustees shall from time to time pay the income to such person or
persons and for such intents and purposes as the married woman shall, notwithstanding
her coverture, direct, but so as the same be not by way of anticipation.
16. Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 390, 41 Eng. Rep. 152 (Ch. 1839);
Baggett v. Meux, I Coll. 138, 63 Eng. Rep. 355 (Ch. 1844), aff'd I Phil. Ch. 627,
41 Eng. Rep. 771 (Ch. 1846).
17. See note 15 supra. Lord Thurlow's reasoning was that since a married
woman's power to alienate is a Imere creature of equity, to the extent to which the
settlement constitutes her a feme sole and no further, equity may modify this power
of alienation by insertion of a restraint on anticipation.
In Baggett v. Meux, s=ora note 16, the Lord Chancellor said that the object of
the doctrine (establishing separate estates) was to give to married women the
enjoyment of property independent of their husbands; but to secure that object, it
was absolutely necessary to restrain them during coverture from alienation. The
reasoning evidently applied to a fee as much as to a life estate, to real property
as much as to personal. The power of a married woman, independent of the trust
for separate use, may be different in real estate from what it is in personal; but a
court of equity, having created in both a new species of estate, may in both cases
modify the incidents of that estate.
For the English rule of jus disponendi, see Taylor v. Meads, 4 De G. J. & S.
597, 46 Eng. Rep. 1050 (Cb. 1865); Picard v. Hine, L.R. 5 Ch. 274 (1869); cf.
Bisnop, EQUITY 101 and cases cited therein.
18. 1 Bisnop, THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN 6.9; Wallace v. Coston, 9 Watts
137 (Pa. 1839); McConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476; 19 Atl. 306 (1890); Thomas
v. Folwell, 2 Whart. 11 (Pa. 1836); Lancaster v. Dolan, I Rawle 231 (Pa. 1829);
Stahl v. Grouse, 1 Pa. 11 (1845)(No power to will where deed contained no power
of appointment); MeMullin v. Beatty, 56 Pa. 389 (1867); Wright v. Brown, 44 Pa.
224 (1863); Insurance Co. v. Foster, 35 Pa. 134 (1859); Rogers v. Smith, 4 Pa.
93 (1847).
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entered into them. However, upon accrual and even without actual
receipt of the income by her, it was free from rcstraint.' 9 Any assignment
of interest not due and payable was wholly void,20 and a married woman's
interest in a fund subject to restraint was protected even against her own
fraudulent acts.
2 '
A restraint on anticipation can only attach to equitable separate
property, and property is not separate unless it belongs to a woman actually
under coverture at the time, although the estate can be created before
marriage.22 When coverture ceases by reason of death or divorce, the
restraint falls off and the property can be frecly disposed of by the widow
or divorcee. When she marries again, it attaches once more to all property
not disposed of by her during the period of intervening freedom.23
The doctrine of the equitable separate estate is a doctrine built up
in general by the great landowners. These were persons accustomed to
using solicitors familiar with the technical requirements of settlements
to the sole and separate use of a married woman. As a practical matter,
the high costs of solicitors' fees precluded individuals with small amounts
of property from applying the special separate use trust. One reason
for the development of the statutory estate was the undesirability of
distinctions based on differences in the amount of property owned by
various classes of people. Another reason was an important shortcoming
of the equitable separate estate. Under the equitable separate estate, if
a trust device was actually employed in the sense that a trustee was
specifically named, it avoided some of the difficulties that might otherwise
arise. But if the husband was trustee either because so designated or
because no one else was specifically named as trustee (which became
more and more the case as time went on), equity would impose a trust
upon the wife's property interest which the husband acquired at law;
nevertheless, the husband having legal title, had a power to defeat the
wife's equitable interest by selling to a bona fide purchaser for value.
Moreover, if a wife sought redress from one who purported to be a bona
fide purchaser or even a mere interloper, she had to bring process by bill
in equity. Toward the middle of the 19th Century, equity was becoming
very complex and expensive and would not be resorted to if it could
possibly be avoided. 24
19. Harnett v. MacDougall, 8 Beav. 187, 50 Eng. Rep. 74 (1845).
20. In re Brettle, 33 L.J. Ch. 471 (1863)6
21. Arnold v. Woodhams, L.R. 16 Eq. 29 (1873), see note 72 infra.
22. Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 390, 41 Eng. Rep. 152 (Cb. 1839).
23. Hughey v. Warner, 124 Tenn. 725, 140 S.W. 1058 (1911). There is,
however, some authority denying revival. See Miller v. Bingham, 1 ]red. Eq. 423
(N.C. 1841).
24. An extra-legal illustration of this situation can be found in the novel "Bleak
House" by Charles Dickens, where the case of Jarndyce v. Jamdyce dragged on for
twenty years and then was discontinued only because the estate was exhausted by
attorneys' fees.
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The first object of the Married Women's statutes was to give a
married woman a separate position with respect to property matters
without the necessity of a settlement to her sole and separate use.
Another advantage of the statutory estate in England and many states
was that the wife's interest could be protected by ordinary legal actions25
although some courts have held that, as between husband and wife, the
statutes merely created a separate estate, with rights enforceable only in
equity?0  Furthermore, the statutory estate does not insist on any particular
form of grant, and since these statutes deprive the husband of the jus
mariti and give the wife a legal estate, the husband is no longer in a
position to defeat the wife's interest by conveying to a bona fide purchaser.
The question now arises as to whether these Married Women's
Property Acts have abolished the wife's separate equitable estate, or
whether the new powers conferred by the statutes are merely supplementary
to those which had developed in equity for a century and a half. 7 One
might logically suppose that if a statute purports to change existing equitable
estates into legal estates,28 the creation of future equitable separate estates
would be prohibited. However, most statutes do not in terms allude to
the equitable separate estate device. A non-spendthrift trust jurisdiction
may rule that its Married Women's statute abolishes the equitable separate
estate on the theory that a married woman now has an equal status and
should be subject to the same liabilities as anyone else. Yet a special
trust for married women with the incident of a restraint on anticipation
might be permitted on the theory that the statutory estate, despite its
advantages, affords inadequate protection against the influence or coercion
of the husband. 29  On the other hand, a restraint on a married woman's
statutory estate may not be sustained in a non-spendsthrift jurisdiction
where married women are put on a substantial parity with others and
where such policy is considered strong enough to obliterate the distinction
between the validity of restraints on her power of alienation and like
restraints on others.;0
It is submitted that the primary purpose of restraining anticipation
of separate estate is to protect the wife from being coerced by her husband
into alienating her interest and that protection from the claims of her
25. English MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS: 45 & 46 VICT., c. 75 (1882);
56 & 57 VIcT., C. (1893); 25 & 26 GEO. 5, c. 30 (1935). 111. Sess. Laws 145
(1861).
26. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 171-85 (1935).
27. Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 170 Md. 615, 185 AtI. 335 (1936).
According to a typical statute, the property which the wife holds at marriage or
which she afterwards acquires, remains her separate property. See note 26 supra.
28. McCarty v. Skelton, 233 Ala. 531, 172 So. 901 (1937).
29. See Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., note 27 svPra.
30. Cropper v. Bowles, 150 Ky. 393, I50 S.W. 380 (1912); Deering v. Tucker,
55 Me. 284 (1867); Brown v. McGill, 87 Md. 161, 39 AtI. 613 (1898); Pacific Nat'l
Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175 (1882); Jackson v. Von Zedlitz, 136 Mass. 342
(1884); Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Atl. 52 (1907).
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creditors is merely incidental. The separate estate notion of freedom from
control and interference of the husband or husbands during times of
marriage is not the same as the purpose of the spendthrift trust designed
to protect the cestui from the interference or control of creditors for a
continuing, uninterrupted period.3' The English courts have consistently
held that no restraint can be imposed on the interest of a beneficiary3
2
with the exception of a restraint on anticipation of a married woman.
33
It was felt that the new powers conferred upon the married woman by
the statutory removal of her disabilities had not only not dispensed with
but had actually increased the need for safeguarding her from the coercion
or improvidence of her husband. Although Parliament has declared that
the wife's estate shall not be encumbered or conveyed by her husband
or seized for his debts, as long as she has the power to encumber her
property, she is subject to yield to the persuasion of her husband. It is
believed that the fact that the restraint on anticipation was expressly
retained by the Acts of 1882 and 189334 does not indicate that the
equitable separate estate of the married woman would have been abolished
without this statutory reservation?54
While in many states of the United States there is no statutory
authority for use of the equitable separate estate device, this device has
not been expressly disallowed notwithstanding the Married Women's
statutes. In two jurisdictions, by express statutory provisions,36 equitable
separate estates may still be created, and there is also considerable decisional
authority to the same effect,
3 7
31. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, 111 N. E. 163
(1916) has a typical spendthrift trust provision:
[E]very payment of income or principle hereinbefore directed or devised to
be made shall be made personally to the persons to whom they are devised
or upon their order or receipt in writing, in every case free from the interference
or control of creditors of such persons, and never by way of anticipation or
assignment.
Bateman v. Lady Faber [1897] 46 V.R. 215. This case is often cited for its
lively language.
32. Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Yes. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811); Young-
husband v. Gisbome, 1 Coll. 400, 63 Eng. Rep. 473 (Ch. 1844); Davidson v. Chalmers,
33 Beav. 653, 55 Eng. Rep. 522 (R.C. 1864).
33. See note 25 supra.
34. See note 4 supra.
35. English MARRIED WoMuN's ACT (1935) 25 & 26 CEo. 5, c. 30. By the
MARRIED WOMEN'S (Restraint upon Anticipation) ACT, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6 c. 78
(1949), it is provided that "no restriction upon anticipation or alienation attached,
or purported to be attached, to the enjoyment of any property by a woman which
could not have been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be
of any effect after the passing of the Act."
36. D.C. CODE 30-207 (1951); VA. CODE ANt. 5139 (1942).
37. Fields v. Gwynn, 19 App. D.C. 99 (1901); looks v. Brown, 62 Ala. 258
1878); Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528 (1868); Musson v. Trigg, 41 Miss. 172
1875); Holliday v. Hively, 198 Pa. 334, 47 Atl. 988 (1901); Hays v. Leonard, 155 Pa,
474, 26 AtI. 664 (1893); MacConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476, 19 Atl. 306 (1890),
Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.. 1075 (1916); Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 170 Md. 615, 185 At. 335 (1936). See also: Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 (1875);
Sampley v. Watson, 43 Ala. 377 (1869); Snyder v. Webb, 3 Cal. 83 (1853); De Vries
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In Richardson v. Stodder*48 a devise in trust was made to A. for the
benefit of B., wife of C., to her sole and separate use and her heirs and
assigns forever. After this devise took effect, B. died leaving C. and their
two children surviving. It was held that B., during her coverture, took
an equitable estate in fee which descended to the children subject only
to C.'s tenancy by the curtesy.1 ' The court said that the statutes which
enable married women to take and hold property to their separate use
do not affect the construction of a gift in trust for them, because their
statutory right of disposal is not absolute and unqualified, and because
the statutes themselves contemplate the necessity or expediency in some
cases of the intervention of trustees.
In Musson v. Trigg40 it appeared that the parties, in contemplation
of marriage, entered into an antenuptial contract by which neither was to
control, manage or intermeddle with the property of the other. In
pursuance of this agreement, the wife conveyed all of her property to X
in trust upon the condition that she should "keep, use and enjoy the same
to her sole and separate use, or to the use of such persons as she by
writing or by last will may appoint." On the question of whether the
conveyance created a separate estate in equity notwithstanding the Married
Women's Act of 1857, the court held that these statutes which afford
v. Conklin, 22 Mich. 255 (1871); Mitchel v. Otey, 23 Miss. 236 (1851)- Colvin v.
Currier, 22 Barb. 371 (N.Y. 1856); Pennsylvania Co. v. Foster, 35 Pa. 134 (1860);
Cf. PERRY, TRuSTS § 677 (1911). But see Lindsay v, Williams, 279 Ky. 749, 132
S.W.2d 65 (1939) where it appeared that a testator bequeathed certain money to his
granddaughter to be invested in a home "to be deeded to her and her heirs free from
the debts and control of any husband she may have and not to he mortgaged or any
lien put upon it." Plaintiff sought specific performance of her contract to sell the
property so acquired to the defendant. The Kentucky court, in consonance with its
rule denying validity to spendthrift provisions, held the restraint void and granted spe-
cific performance, although Kentucky courts have upheld restraints reasonable as to time.
Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen. 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W. 247 (1916). See Dollner,
Potter & Co. v. Snow, 16 Fla. 86 (1877).
Counsel for the defendant apparently did not allude to the possibility of sustaining
the restraint under the equitable separate use doctrine, and the court assumed that the
testator intended a fee simple title in the donee as distinguished from an equitable title.
'I'his decision, therefore, is not clear authority that the equitable separate estate and re-
straint on anticipation have been abolished by the Married Women's statutes.
38. Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528 (1868).
39. The restraint in this case did not attempt to deprive the husband of curtesy,
and it is generally held in accord with this case that the husband is entitled
to eurtesy. This result is believed sound, inasmuch as the policy of protecting tile
wife against the husband would seem to be satisfied by preventing him from obtaining
an interest in her property during her lifetime and need not be extended for the benefit
of her heirs. Appleton v. Rowley, L.R. 8 Eq. 139 (1869). This reasoning, however, has
not generally been applied where by the terms of the trust it has been attempted to
exclude the husband from curtesy and the weight of authority permits curtesy to be ex-
pressly excluded. Rautenbush v. Donaldson, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 752, 18 S.W. 536 (1892);
McCulloch v. Valentine, 24 Neb. 215, 38 NWNI. 854 (1888). Where the husband
is the settlor, it has been held to raise a rebuttable presumption of intention to release
his claim to curtesy. Rigler v. Cloud, 14 Pa. 361 (1859); Jones v. Jones, 96 Va. 74,
32 S.E. 463 (1899).40. Musson v. Trigg, 51 Miss. 172 (1875). The court also said that at common
law the mere intervention of a trustee clothed with the legal title (where the equitable
title in the wife was not limited to her separate use) would not prevent the marital rights
(jus mariti) of the husband from attaching to the wife's equitable interest.
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separate legal estates to married women do not interfere with equitable
estates which arise out of settlements on a feme covert by deed or devise,
nor were they intended to abolish or abridge such estates.
Hooks v. Brown4 presented the case of a devise to a married woman
for life with remainder on her death to go to the issue of her marriage
with her then husband. The devise declared that the property should
not be subject to his debts and directed him as trustee to appropriate
the rents and profits for "the use and benefit of his wife and children."
The court said that the Married Women's statutes have no reference to
or effect upon equitable separate estates. They reasoned that these
statutes affect only estates made separate by operation of law.
In MacConnell v. Lindsay/2 it appeared that a testatrix bequeathed
certain real estate to the separate use of her adopted daughter. The
Married Women's statute limited a wife's power of disposition of her
statutory estate by requiring a joinder by the husband in any mortgage
or conveyance of her real estate. The defendant with whom the wife
had contracted to sell the property refused to accept her sole deed on
the ground that she could not make a good title. It was contended that
the trust should no longer be sustained, the reason for it having been
removed, for the statute relieved the wife's real estate from the common
law rights and control of her husband. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, in rejecting this argument, held that since the Act of 1887 a
settlement of land for the separate use of a married woman was still
subject to the same rules of equity as before. The court reasoned that
inasmuch as the Act was passed for the benefit of the wife, it was an
enlargement and not a dimunition of her rights. The joinder provision
would therefore apply only to the separate statutory estate of the married
woman, as distinguished from her separate equitable estate which had always
existed only in equity.4'
In Hays v. Leonard44 the court in affirming its earlier position empha-
sized that while the Married Women's Acts were effectual to eliminate
the legal control of the husband over the wife's estate, they did not
weaken his influence over her.
41. Hooks v. Brown, 62 Ala. 258 (1878). The court cited an earlier Alabama
case to the same effect. Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 (1875). The court also noted
that the statement that the property given is not to be subject to the debts of the hus-
band will not of itself create an equitable separate estate, because it does not import
an exclusion of the husband's title, but only one of the incidents thereof. Moreover,
the court stated that had there been an attempt to restrain anticipation, it would have
been sustained.
42. MacConnell v. Lindsay, 131 Pa. 476, 19 Atl. 306 (1890).
43. The court held that the Married Women's Acts did not affect the right of a
married woman to a settlement of her estate upon herself. The case also distinguishes
between a restraint on anticipation and a spendthrift trust in that a separate use trust
for a married woman does not fail because the will creating it names no trustee.
44. Hays v. Leonard, 155 Pa. 474, 26 AtI. 664 (1893).
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In Holliday v. Hively4' land or the proceeds thereof were bequeathed
to a married woman for her sole and separate use, independent of her
present or any future husband. Thereafter, the wife, having elected to
take the land rather than the proceeds thereof, purported to mortgage it
to the plaintiffs, who were now seeking to foreclose. Although there
was no express restraint ol anticipation in the will, the court, in reversing
the trial judge, held that since the appellant had no powers of disposition
beyond those conferred by the instrument creating the.trust, she had no
power to mortgage the property during coverture. Here, not only was
the jus disponendi not given by the will, but the statutory silence was
also treated as a prohibition.
In Fields v. Gwynn'' it appeared that the deed of settlement on
a married woman expressly excluded the husband from any interest in the
estate conveyed and provided that the estate could not be disposed of
by deed, will, or any other mode of alienation or anticipation. The court
held that a deed of trust of such estate by the wife and her husband
to secure the payment of their joint promissory note was void. It reasoned
that the Married Women's Act 47 did not by implication prevent the
creation of a valid equitable estate with a restraint on anticipation in
the wife not within the common law rule avoiding gen6ral restraints on
alienation.4
8
In Travis v. Sitz49 and Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.50 the
above decisions are approved and the acts removing the disabilities of
coverture in respect to married women have no effect upon the equitable
separate estate and the restraint on anticipation.
The question of whether or not the separate estate trust has been
rendered useless by the Married Women's legislation may arise in juris-
dictions which do not permit spendthrift trusts as well as those which
do.5' In a jurisdiction which does not permit spendthrift trusts, the
survival of the separate estate notion may depend upon the above dis-
tinction between a restraint on anticipation, which was designed to protect
45. Holliday v. Hively, 198 Pa. 335, 47 Atl. 988 (1901).
46. Fields v. Gwynn, 19 App. D.C. 99 (1901). This case preceded the express
statutory provisions for the creation of equitable separate estates. See note 36 supra.
47. MARRIED WoMEN's ACT OF 1869, R.S.D.C., §§727-29.
48. Counsel for appellants contended that the Married Women's Act not only
abolished any restraint upon alienation contained in a settlement upon a married woman,
but also the settlement of the equitable estate itself.
49. Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075 (1916); see note 30 supra.
50. Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 170 Md. 615, 185 At. 335 (1936).
51. The validity of the restraint on alienation prior to the Married Women's stat-
ute had been recognized in Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Vest Virginia, and in the Federal Courts. See Hauser v. St.
Louis, 170 Fed. 906 (8th Cir. 1909). Annot. 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 426 (1910).
It is arguable that even if the separate estate in equity is not abolished by a par-
ticular married women's statute, the effect of the statute in altering the legal status of
a married woman has removed the reason for further equitable jurisdiction. Consequently,
equity might voluntarily relinquish a jurisdiction which it would not have assumed as an
original question, had it felt the married women's remedy at law to be adequate,
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a marricd woman from her husband, on the one hand and a spendthrift
trust, which was designed to protect a cestui from his creditors without
special regard to marital status, on the other.
An alternative to a spendthrift trust ' which has been adopted iin
England by statute 3 is the protective trust.54 This involves a provision
that upon an attempted alienation of the beneficiary's interest, voluntary
or involuntary, the original trust terminates and is superseded by a
discretionary trust for the support of the beneficiary.
One might assume that the protective trust as an alternative to the
spendthrift trust would afford even greater protection to a married woman
than the restraint on anticipation, for the protective trust has the advantage
of continuous protection throughout the life of the married woman, which
does not cease upon discoverture.r5 However, in a very important class
of eases, the protective trust cannot be substituted for the restraint on
anticipation. In a marriage settlement where a power of appointment is
given to one or both of the spouses to appoint the trust property to the
52. Other alternatives to spendthrift trusts: 1. Foreign trusts -establishment of a
trust to be administered in another state which recognizes the validity of spendthrift
trusts. On usual conflict of laws principles, the place of administration or "seat" of the
trust governs. (As to a trust res consisting of realty, the law of the situs governs.)
2. Discretionary trusts - where it is provided that payments to the beneficiary shall be
made at the discretion of the beneficiary or a third person, including the discretionary
power to withhold from the beneficiary all payments or beneficial use. 3. Provisions for
forfeiture upon involuntary alienation. 4. Trusts for support where, although no re-
straint is imposed, the beneficiary's interest is limited to the particular specified purpose,
and neither the cestui, his creditor or assignee can compel payment except for support.
5. Personal trust-where the interest of the cestui is of such a personal nature as to be
unavailable to anyone else -i.e., land in trust with a provision that the cestui shall
occupy it as a home, or benefits awarded under a Workmen's Compensation Law.
Alexander & Co. v. Owens, 4 Ky. L. Rep. 621, 11 Ky. Opin. 898 (1883); Surace v.
Danna, 248 N.Y. 18, 161 N.E. 315 (1928). 6. Inseparability of Interests - where the
fact that there are several beneficiaries treated as a unit results in the inability of any
one (or combination of them less than the whole unit) or his creditor to alienate his
interest. 7. An express provision that the beneficiary is not to receive his interest in the
trust unless he is financially solvent, lull v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 245 U.S. 312
(1917). 8. State statutes may provide that the proceeds of an insurance policy payable
in installments to the beneficiary may be made inalienable.
53. TRUSTI.E ACT. 15 CEO. 5, c. 19, 4 33 (1925). The statute is mnerely declara-
tory of the common law, for it is expressly provided that nothing contained therein
should operate to validate any trust otherwise invalid.
54. 1 BOCERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 221 (1935); In re Spencer, 1 Ch. 533
(1935).
55. Section 169 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, gives the court power to remove
a restraint on anticipation in a proper case. Unlike the restraint on anticipation, property
subject to a protective trust cannot be disposed of during periods of discoverture.
The feeling of the proponents of the emancipation of women is that a married
woman no longer needs protection from the "kicks or caresses" of her husband and
therefore that all disabilities of coverture should be entirely done away with. However,
this extreme view has not been accepted, and although restraints on anticipation were
abolished by statute (see note 35 supra), the statutory protective trust has been pre-
served on the theory that if a woman requires any protection at all, it is not during
coverture, but during the emotionally unstable period of widowhood, and the restraint
on anticipation is removed at the very time when the woman needs protection most.
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issue of the marriage, it would be possible, under the equitable separate
estate doctrine, to appoint a share in favor of a daughter without power
of anticipation. Such restraint would be effective although no express
power to impose it is mentioned in the settlement. On the other hand,
the protective trust would not be available in such a case because inherent
in this device is a grant of discretionary power to the trustee to decide
to whom the income is to be paid after the happening of the event which
terminates the original trust.
The donce of the power would thereby be delegating a power to the
trustee which is conferred upon him personally by the settlement, and
it is well settled that the donee of a power cannot delegate it. 6 Moreover,
it may be felt undesirable in a non-spendthrift jurisdiction to permit a
restraint on alienation which is primarily designed to protect a married
woman, to operate when a woman is unmarried. On the other hand,
the restraint on anticipation attaches only during marriage and is lifted
during periods of discoverture.
Another possible advantage of the restraint on anticipation over the
protective trust as an alternative to spendthrift trusts involves restraints
which may last until a time more remote than the period of the rule
against perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities does not prevent the
creation of estates to endure for a period greater than that prescribed by
the rule so long as the estate vests within the period of the rule. The
question then arises as to whether a restraint on alienation may be imposed
which might be effective beyond this period. In England, it is well settled
that the restraint on anticipation in certain situations offends the per-
petuities rule.Y5 Although Jessel, the Master of the Rolls, unwillingly
followed this rule in In re Ridlt 8 , lie argued that the restraint on
anticipation was an equitable exception to the general rule against
inalienability of property. Hence, there did not appear to be any reason
not to extend this exception to such a restraint applied to an interest
otherwise valid under the rule against perpetuities. Moreover, the English
cases hold a restraint on anticipation valid when it is imposed upon the
interest of a woman born at the time of the vesting of the trust, although
a member of a class which might have included persons born after that
56. In re Boulton's Settlement (1928) Ch. 703. That the delegation of the power
vitiates the appointment. cf. Williamson v. Farwell (1887) 35 Ch. D. 128.
57. In re Game, (1907) 1 Ch. 276; Trustees Executors and Agency Co. v. Jenner,
22 Viet. L.R. 584 (1897); In re Boyd, 63 L.T.R. 92 (1890); In re Errington, (1887)
W.N. 23; Cooper v. Laroche, L.R. 17 Ch. D. 368 (1881); In re Ridley, 11 Ch. D.
645, Jesse] (1879) M.R.; In re Cunynghame's Settlement, LR. 11 Eq. 324 (1871); In re
Teague's Settlement, L.R. 10 Eq. 564 (1870); Armitage v. Coates, 35 Beav. 1, 55
Eng. Rep. 794 (Ch. 1865).
58. In re Ridley, see note 57 suo.ra.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
time?" The precise question has not yet been decided in any American
jurisdiction. But Gray has said80 that "the validity or invalidity of the
restraint with respect to the perpetuities rule must be determined with
reference to the character of the estate itself. For instance, whether it is
to a married woman, and has nothing to do with the time the interest
begins . . . a future estate, not in itself too remote, can be subjected to
the same restraints to which a present estate can be subjected . . . that
is, the same restrictions which are good on present estates should be held
good on future estates."
On the other hand, discretionary trusts, of which protective trusts
are but one variety, have been held wholly void when they may extend
beyond the period of the rule, although they commence at a time which
is not too remote.61
Thus, in a jurisdiction not permitting spendthrift trusts, where it is
desired to avoid a harsh rule against perpetuities, this result can be attained
by sustaining a restraint on anticipation.62
Another incidental advantage of a restraint on anticipation over a
protective trust is that it may prevent the operation of the equitable
doctrine of election where property is willed to a woman. The doctrine
provides that where a deed or will professes to make a general disposition
of property for the benefit of a person named in it, a prerequisite to the
acceptance of a benefit under the will is that such person conform with
its provisions and renounce every right inconsistent with them. Thus, the
beneficiary must either accept or reject the instrument as a whole. The
rationale of the doctrine of election is that the intention of the donor is
presumed to be that his deed or will shall be wholly effective, and the
only way in which this intention can be carried out is by forcing an election.
However, the presumption is rebuttable by any indication of a contrary
intention of the settlor or testator. This may be either an affirmative
expression by the author of the instrument that the doctrine is not to
59. In re Game (1907) 1 Ch. 276; In re Fcrnelev's 'i'rusts (1902) 1 Ch. 543;
Herbert v. Webster, 15 Ch. D. 610 (1880); Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Jur. N.S. 1076, 28
L.J. Ch. (n.s.) 95 (1858) Wood, V.C.
60. CRAY, RULE AGAINST PRPETUrnES, 437a, 4371, 438 (3d ed. 1915). This
view also appears in the second edition (1895); But see GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENA-
TION (1883) and GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 436 (1st ed. 1886), where he had
earlier approved the English rule, on the theory that a restraint on alienation in itself
amounted to a series of successive gifts, and that subjecting a gift to such a condition
was as obnoxious to the rule as any other.
61. Bundy v. United States Trust Co., 257 Mass. 73, 153 N.E. 340 (1926);
Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 50 Atl. 898 (1901); Moore v. Moore, 6 Jones Eq.
132 (N.C. 1860); In re Benyon-Winsor, 143 L.T. 178 (1917); In re Bernard's Settle-
ment, (1916) 1 Ch. 552, 558; In re de Sommery, (1912) 2 Gh. 622, 632; In re Blew
(1906) 1 Ch. 624; ef.. 142 L.T. 343 (1917); GA Y, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 246,
410a, 439-442a (3d ed. 1915).
62. On principle, the rule against perpetuities would be equally inapplicable to a
spendthrift trust. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERIET6i iIlRS;note 60 subra..
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apply or an implication from the nature of the gift or other circumstances
in the instrument.
A person electing to take under the will or deed must transfer his
property in compliance with the instrument before he may take the
property which is given him. But if he chooses to keep the property
which the instrument attempted to take from him, to the extent that those
who would otherwise have taken his property arc deprived of a benefit
by his election, they are compensated out of that which he would have
taken under the deed or will.
The English courts have held that a restraint on anticipation annexed
to property given to a married woman is sufficient indication of an intention
that the property so given is exempt for purposes of compensation if she
elects to take against the instrument.113  This necessarily precludes an
election since there is no fund out of which compensation can be ordered.
If the property were allowed to be used for compensation, the restraint
on anticipation would be defeated to the extent to which the property
was so used.64
Since the only material point is the settlor's intention as indicated
by the restraint on anticipation, the English court 5 has held that the
suspension of the restraint when the woman is unmarried is immaterial,
since the testator's intention, as construed from his language, and the
legal effect of that same language are two entirely different things.
In some spendthrift jurisdictions, there may be a failure to distinguish
between a restraint on the alienation of the separate property of a married
woman and the spendthrift trust, and a tendency to treat them in the
same manner.66 Although in most circumstances these two devices have
very similar consequences, it may be vital to distinguish between them
in at least two types of situations.
In the first place, an unqualified or general restraint on the alienation
of an estate in fee simple, as distinguished from a restraint on use, is
universally held void, and by the weight of authority even a partial restraint
limited as to time or persons is void.07 Therefore, even in a state where
a spendthrift trust is permitted, an attempted restraint on alienation may
63. In re Vardon's Trusts, 31 Ch. D. 275 (1886) involves a marriage settlement,
but the principle in the case of a will is the same.
64. For an extreme application of this principle, see Robinson v. Wheelwright, 6
De G.M. & G. 535, 43 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Cb. 1856), where it was held that the court
had no power to interfere for the purpose of alienating lands devised with a restraint
on anticipation, although by another will, property of far greater value was devised to
a married woman upon condition of her so alienating it.
65. Haynes v. Forester, S.J., 257; L.J. 72; L.T. 334.
66. Even where it is recognized that their origins were quite distinct; Reid v. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 86 Md. 446, 38 AtI. 899 (1897); Ewalt v. Davenhill, 257 Pa. 385,
101 At. 756 (1917).
67. GRAr, RESTRAINT ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, §§ 278, 279 (Zd
ed. 1895).
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be invalid if no trust is created by the deed or will. Where it is not
expressly provided that the gift is on trust or if no trustee is named,
it is held that there is no spendthrift trust. 8 On the other hand, where
there is a restraint on anticipation of an equitable separate estate, the
trust does not fall because no trustee is namedY"
Secondly, it is quite uniformly held that a spendthrift trust created
by a person for his own benefit is invalid as against subsequent creditors,
independent of statute or the law of fraudulent conveyances?' Although
the common law rule prohibits one from putting his property beyond the
reach of his creditors, even though lie is solvent, statutes in the insurance
field 7' exempting the value of life insurance from the claims of the
insured's creditors indicate that it may be desirable to modify this rule.
The courts of equity under the separate estate doctrine recognized the Tight
of a woman to settle an estate on herself which would be free from her
own creditors during coverture, 72 and it has been held73- that this right
is unaffected where the separate estate and the statutory estate are
coexistent. The exercise of this right would permit a woman to safeguard
property accumulated by her own effort, as well as property accruing
from previous marriages.
If a realistic balance is sought between the property emancipation and
the protection of a married woman, particularly in respect to her husband
and his creditors, and ill respect to herself when widowed, the use of
the equitable separate estate with its restraint on anticipation device (still
possible in many jurisdictions) merits serious consideration.
68. Nolan v. Nolan, 218 Pa. 135, 67 Al. 52 (1907), holding that a person who
is sui juris cannot, even as against subsequent creditors, settle his property in trust to
pay the income to himself for life and the corpus to his heirs or appointees by will,
although lie expressly states that the instrument shall be irrevocable; Schenk v. Barnes,
156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Chornley v. Smith, 139 Pa. 584, 21 Atl. 135
(1891); contra, Thomas v. House, 145 Va. 742, 134 S.E. 673 (1926).
69. See notes 11 and 43 supra.
70. The principle that a transfer in trust for the benefit of the settlor which hinders
or delays existing creditors may be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance and the property
reached by such creditors, applied to any transfer, in trust or othenvise, independent of
spendthrift trusts in one's own favor. See GL.FNN;, FRAOULENT CONVEYANCES (1931).
71. New York Insurance Law, § 55a, exempt even though the insured retains the
power to change the beneficiary or to collect the surrender value.
.72: Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S.W. 516 (1899); Beckett v. Tasker, 19
Q.B. 7 (1887); In re Glenville, 31 Ch. 1). 537 (1886); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Ch. D.
605 (1885); Thomas v. Price, 46 L.J. Ch. 762 (1877); Wainford v. Heyl, L.R. 20
Eq. 324 (1875); Arnold v. Woodhams, L.R. 16 Eq. 33 (1873); Clive v. Carew, 1
Johns & H. 199, 205, 70 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ch. 1859),
73. MacConnetl v. Lindsay, see note 43 supra; Musson v. Trigg, see note 40 supra;
Lord Eldon, in Jackson v. lobhouse, note 15 supra, observed that if the rule were
otherwise, husbands desiring to defeat the restraint would only have to exercise their
marital influence in such a manner as to induce their wives to commit fraudulent acts.
See note ?1 Supjrd.
